Eastern Winds: Xi Gains Influence Over Global Politics & Trump’s Power Wanes as They Prepare to Meet in China

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The United States grapples for control of the Strait of Hormuz. The Russo-Ukrainian War enters its fifth year. And Xi Jinping prepares for a mid-May meeting with President Trump. How will Xi lead in a post-hegemonic world?

Xi’s authoritarianism:

  • 2012: Xi Jinping assumed power as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party
  • 2013: China begins to use grey zone tactics in the South China Sea (RAND, 2022)
  • 2014: Xi launches counterterrorism efforts against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang that will lead to allegations of crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch, 2023)
  • 2018: Xi takes steps to rule indefinitely when he oversees the abolition of term limits for the President of the People’s Republic of China (China…, 2018).
  • 2020: Xi uses a national security law to suppress protest movements in Hong Kong (Maizland & Fong, 2026)
  • 2023: Xi continues his crackdown on political dissidents with Article 23 (Amnesty International, 2025)

Xi’s assertions:

  • Having exerted influence over Hong Kong and parts of the South China Sea, Xi’s CCP looks to Taiwan as an essential piece of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
  • China adheres to the One-China Principle which asserts Taiwan (i.e. the Republic of China or ROC) is a part of China (a province of the PRC) (Questions…, n.d.).
  • China also claims the Spratly (Nansha), Paracel (Xisha), and other Islands in the South China Sea (South…, n.d.)
Secretariat of Government of Guangdong Province, Republic of China (January 1947), Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Foreign or domestic?

So, from the CCP’s point of view, does foreign policy even apply to their claimed territories? China’s Belt and Road Initiative, foreign infrastructure projects, and UN donations involve foreign policy but Taiwan and the South China Sea are China (Hass, 2023; McBride et al., 2023). Xi’s CCP treats the Philippines as a foreign territory, but views Hong Kong, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and other disputed border areas as internal territories (for context see historical Sino-Russian and Sino-India border disputes).

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

List of Disputed Territories CCP views as China:

-> Sino-Russian territorial disputes (Vekina, 2024)

  • Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island

-> Sino-Indian territorial disputes (Haddad, 2020)

  • Arunachal Pradesh / South Tibet
  • Kashmir – Ladakh: Trans-Karakoram Tract / Aksai Chin

-> Sino-Bhutan territorial disputes (Haddad, 2020)

  • Doklam Plateau

-> Sino-Japan territorial disputes (Ahmed, 2026)

  • Senkaku / Diaoyu Dao Islands

-> Sino-Taiwan territorial disputes (Hass, 2023; Ahmed, 2026)

  • Taiwan: Taiwan Province / Republic of China
  • Diaoyutai / Diaoyu Dao Islands
Encyclopædia Britannica (n.d.) Physical map of China at https://www.britannica.com/place/China/Relief vs Ministry of Natural Resources of the People’s Republic of China (2023) Standard map of China at http://bzdt.ch.mnr.gov.cn/

“Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake…”

  • Napoleon Bonaparte’s quote is often mistakenly attributed to Sun Tzu (Alison, 1836; Seitz, 2026).
  • Tzu’s The Art of War (2010) advises military leaders to “Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant” and states “the enemy himself provides the opportunity of defeating the enemy”.
  • While Xi may be growing weary of feigning weakness, the CCP’s attitude toward the Iran war appears to align with the pragmatic words of the little corporal (Hass, 2023; The Economist, 2026).
  • China is awaiting opportunities and building its military while covertly supporting Russia and Iran in their wars against western nations (Batur, 2026, BBC News, 2026; The Economist, 2026).

China’s time?

Ian Bremmer suggests Xi may pitch a PRC-ROC peace deal to the dealmaker, President Trump (Prof G Pod – Scott Galloway, 2026). Such a deal may blend well with Trump’s narcissistic nepotism and the second Trump Administration’s authoritarian focus on regional spheres of influence. President Trump revels in the “Donroe Doctrine” reflecting Manifest Destiny politics of an aggressively expansive 19th-century United States. Imperialist realpolitik grew U.S. borders to the Pacific Ocean in the 1800’s. How far will China go in the 21st century?

A unique opportunity?

President Trump’s self-aggrandizing impulsivity is a gift to Xi. If Trump wants riches and influence in the Western Hemisphere, Xi needs to find leverage there: precious mineral contracts, debt forgiveness, Cuba? Trump’s arrogance and greed blend well with the CCP’s efforts to expand China’s influence through formal integration of disputed territories. Trump may be the enemy who “…provides the opportunity of defeating the enemy.”

A sword or an olive branch?

Will Xi be an autocratic, democratic, or laissez-faire world leader? If recent history is predictive, Xi is likely to expand his strongman tactics abroad. A recent hot mic caught Xi and Putin discussing immortality with a much younger Kim laughing amenably. These men are prioritizing perpetual power over succession and retirement.

The Rising Storm: 压倒性力量 (yādǎoxìng lìliàng)

Nations doubt U.S. guarantees of dollars and military dominance in an increasingly disordered multipolar world. Eurasian and African nations are bolstering their military budgets (Hussein & Duggal, 2026). Conflicts in Yemen, Israel, Sudan, Congo, the Sahel, Afghanistan, and other regions surround the Russo-Ukrainian and U.S.-Iranian wars (Global Conflict Tracker | CFR, n.d.). Chinese rejuvenation and expansionism in the East accompanies a resurgence of regional imperialism in the West. If the U.S. withdraws from Ukraine and Taiwan, how cold will the east wind be?

Sources:

Alison, A. (1836). History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution in 1789 to the restoration of the Bourbons in 1815 (Vol. X). [Publisher].

Amnesty International. (2025, March 28). Hong Kong: Article 23 law used to ‘normalize’ repression one year since enactment. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/hong-kong-article-23-law-used-to-normalize-repression-one-year-since-enactment/

Batur, A. (2026, March 16). Funding war, courting crisis: Why China’s support for Russia requires a European response. ECFR. https://ecfr.eu/article/funding-war-courting-crisis-why-chinas-support-for-russia-requires-a-european-response/

BBC News. (2026, April 17). China’s hidden role in the Iran war | The Security Brief [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ODPHLN91jY

China makes historic move to allow Xi to rule indefinitely. (2018, March 11). PBS News. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/china-makes-historic-move-to-allow-xi-to-rule-indefinitely#:~:text=World%20Mar%2011%2C%202018%209,independent%20Beijing%2Dbased%20political%20commentator.

Chu, M. M., Torode, G., & Slodkowski, A. (2026, April 16; Updated April 17, 2026). China steps up Iran diplomacy while seeking smooth summit with Trump. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-steps-up-iran-diplomacy-while-seeking-smooth-summit-with-trump-2026-04-17/

Encyclopædia Britannica. (n.d.). Physical map of China [Map]. In China. Retrieved May 2, 2026, from https://www.britannica.com/place/China/Relief

Global Conflict Tracker | CFR Interactives. (n.d.). Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker

Haddad, M. (2020, September 9). Mapping India and China’s disputed borders. Al Jazeera English. https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/mapping-india-and-china-disputed-borders/index.html

Hass, R. (2023, August 1). From strategic reassurance to running over roadblocks: A review of Xi’s foreign policy record. China Leadership. https://www.prcleader.org/post/from-strategic-reassurance-to-running-over-roadblocks-a-review-of-xi-jinping-s-foreign-policy-recor

Hong Kong becomes part of the People’s Republic of China | History | Research Starters | EBSCO Research. (n.d.). EBSCO. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/hong-kong-becomes-part-peoples-republic-china

Human Rights Watch (2023, September 1). China: Unrelenting crimes against humanity targeting Uyghurs. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/31/china-unrelenting-crimes-against-humanity-targeting-uyghurs

Hussein, M. A., & Duggal, H. (2026, April 29). Five charts that show the rise of global militarisation. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/29/five-charts-that-show-the-rise-of-global-militarisation

Jain, B. M. (2025). India–China border dispute: A critical inquiry. Chinese Journal of International Review, 7(2).

Maizland, L., & Fong, C. (2026, February 9). Hong Kong’s freedoms: what China promised and how it’s cracking down. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown

McBride, J., Berman, N., & Chatzky, A. (2023, February 2). China’s massive belt and road initiative. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative

Ministry of Natural Resources of the People’s Republic of China. (2023). Standard map of China (2023 edition) (Map No. GS(2023)2762) [Map]. http://bzdt.ch.mnr.gov.cn/

Prof G Pod – Scott Galloway. (2026, April 30). The Iran War Has No Exit — ft. Ian Bremmer | Prof G Conversations [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgyPxYp-52A

RAND (2022). A new framework for understanding and countering China’s gray zone tactics. In RESEARCH BRIEF [Report]. RAND Corporation. Retrieved April 19, 2026, from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/RBA500/RBA594-1/RAND_RBA594-1.pdf

Seitz, I. (2026, March 3). Military Quote of the Day from Napoleon Bonaparte: ‘Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake…’ 19FortyFive. https://www.19fortyfive.com/2026/03/military-quote-of-the-day-from-napoleon-bonaparte-never-interrupt-your-enemy-when-he-is-making-a-mistake/

South China Sea issue. (n.d.). https://fi.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/ztxw/SCSI/#:~:text=Since%20its%20founding%20on%201,administration%20and%20making%20diplomatic%20representations.

The Economist. (2026, April 1). How China hopes to win from the war: Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/04/01/how-china-hopes-to-win-from-the-war

Trace China’s rise to power. (n.d.). https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/

Tzu, S. (2010). The art of war. Capstone Publishing.

Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question (2):What is the one-China principle? What is the basis of the one-China principle? (n.d.). https://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/20220812Taiwan/202208/t20220815_10743591.htm

Venkina, E. (2024, June 14). One island, two countries: A look at how Chinese-Russian relations are playing out in the Far East: Russia and China have signed a roadmap on joint development of a once-disputed island. But is it a “win-win” scenario? Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/one-island-two-countries-a-look-at-how-chinese-russian-relations-are-playing-out-in-the-far-east

Appendix 1: Google Gemini’s List of China’s Active Border/Territorial Disputes

As of May 2026, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintains extensive territorial claims across its land and maritime borders, often utilizing “gray zone” tactics—coercive actions short of open warfare—to alter the status quo.

The following is a breakdown of these territories and the most recent recorded incidents.

1. Maritime Disputes

Philippines (West Philippine Sea / South China Sea)

China claims nearly the entire South China Sea via its “10-dash line,” overlapping the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

  • Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal): On June 17, 2024, China Coast Guard (CCG) personnel armed with knives and axes boarded Philippine Navy vessels, leading to injuries and the seizure of equipment (Wikipedia, 2024). In October 2025, cyanide poisoning of reef areas was allegedly used to sabotage Philippine outposts (International Crisis Group, 2026).
  • Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc): In August 2025, a CCG vessel collided with a Chinese destroyer during a botched maneuver to expel Philippine ships. In April 2026, China installed a 352-meter floating barrier at the entrance of the shoal (CSIS, 2026; International Crisis Group, 2026).
  • Thitu Island (Pag-asa Island): On October 12, 2025, CCG ships rammed and water-cannoned Philippine government vessels near the island (CSIS, 2026).

Taiwan

Beijing considers Taiwan a breakaway province. Recent tactics focus on normalizing a military presence around the island.

  • ADIZ and Median Line: In 2025, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted its largest ever air and maritime presence around Taiwan, effectively erasing the “median line” buffer (Brookings, 2026; House.gov, 2026).
  • Kinmen Islands: In January 2026, a Chinese military drone violated Taiwan’s territorial airspace for the first time (Brookings, 2026).

Japan (East China Sea)

China claims the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), which are administered by Japan.

  • Constant Presence: In 2025, Chinese government vessels operated in the contiguous zone around the islands for 357 days—a record high (Al-Monitor, 2026; IP Defense Forum, 2026).
  • Armed Patrols: Since mid-2024, the CCG has routinely deployed four vessels at a time, all equipped with 76mm deck-mounted autocannons (IP Defense Forum, 2026).

2. Land Disputes

India

The dispute involves the 2,100-mile Line of Actual Control (LAC).

  • Arunachal Pradesh (South Tibet): In December 2022, approximately 300 PLA soldiers clashed with Indian troops near Tawang (CNAS, 2023).
  • Ladakh: Tensions remain high following the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. As of June 2025, the U.S. State Department maintains travel advisories for eastern Ladakh due to sporadic border violence (Travel.State.gov, 2025).

Bhutan

China has shifted from diplomatic negotiations to a “fait accompli” strategy of settlement.

  • Cross-Border Villages: By April 2026, China had constructed at least 22 settlements (approximately 825 sq km) inside territory traditionally considered Bhutanese, particularly in the Doklam plateau and the Beyul valleys (Policy Commons, 2026; Wikipedia, 2026).

Russia

Despite a 2008 treaty, China’s 2023 “Standard Map” reasserted claims over the entire Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island (Greater Ussuri Island), half of which was previously ceded to Russia (Sankei Shimbun, 2023).

Nepal

While no active military clashes are reported, local Nepali officials have raised concerns over border pillar shifts. In August 2025, the two nations agreed to share information on glacial lake flooding risks, a move seen as a step toward managing sensitive border-zone infrastructure (Climate Change News, 2025).

References

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